Nickhil Singh
Title: Why Nietzsche is Smarter than you
In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche attacks the very foundations of contemporary morality. He says of the descendents of the Judeo-Christians, “It is because of their impotence that in them that hatred grows to monstrous and uncanny proportions, to the most spiritual and poisonous kind of hatred” (1.7). In particular, Nietzsche believes that Judeo-Christianity’s reactivity and propensity for suffering have altered man’s natural state. In fact, Nietzsche argues that with the imposition of the ascetic ideal, man’s will to power is repressed (3.28). Without fully expressing his will to power, man is a reactive and not a creative beast. Thus, man has “weakened” himself and prevented himself from achieving his most powerful state; that of a value-giving creature (p.6). Although critics harp about Nietzsche’s inability to suggest an alternative to the current constitution of values, the value of Nietzsche’s critique comes from his ability to make us question our beliefs. As a society, we are not apt to think about the origins of our simplest values or question why we value the quest for knowledge. By providing an alternative origin to current societal values, Nietzsche at least strengthens, weakens or even changes our own convictions in our values.
Accordingly, in this essay I will contend that Nietzsche, by showing that the ascetic ideal represses man’s will to power, successfully brings into question the foundations and validity of society’s morals and values for the overmen of society. In connection with the first argument, Nietzsche, in order to motivate his overmen into action, spends little time describing his future state and instead focuses his essay on critiquing the problems with morality.
To understand what Nietzsche envisions for the future, we must first understand what he means by the ascetic ideal and its relation to man’s will to power. As Nietzsche describes the ascetic ideal, “That the ascetic ideal has meant so many things to man, however, is an expression of the basic fact of the human will, its horror vacui, it needs a goal- and it will rather will nothingness than not will” (3.1). Specifically, Nietzsche believes that man must always have a reason for living. It is in man’s nature to give value to something in order to rationalize his existence. In fact, man needs this reason for living so much that he would rather will nothingness than accept the fact that there isn’t a reason for living . Now, man does this in a variety of ways as evidenced by Nietzsche’s examples of the artist, philosopher, priest and scientist . More importantly, the ascetic ideal is a manifestation of man’s propensity to “will to power .” In fact, the ascetic ideal represses man’s will to power (3.26)! By nature, man is a cruel and power craving beast (1.13). Logically, man needs power over his own life before anything else and the ascetic ideal is the ultimate manifestation of the will to power. Unfortunately, it is the ascetic ideal that destroys man’s love of himself and prevents him from expressing this will.
Only by Nietzsche’s conception of the future will man’s will to power be fully conceptualized on earth. Nietzsche believes that mankind’s current search for knowledge will lead us to the point where nihilism dominates everyone. If the ascetic ideal is to be eradicated, which Nietzsche thinks is its logical conclusion, a great man, Zarathustra, must rise to power . As Nietzsche describes Zarathustra, “This man of the future, who will redeem us not only from the hitherto reigning ideal but also from that which was bound to grow out of it, the great nausea, the will to nothingness… restores its goal to the earth and his hope to man… he must come one day” (2.24). In particular, Zarathustra is the man who has the courage to realize that morality does not exist. Instead, by fully expressing his will to power, Zarathustra creates his own values, knows he creates his own values and expresses his will to power in a morality of his own, which is the most free and glorious manner possible (1.12). Even more, Zarathustra is a man who aspires to some sort of greatness, the type of greatness that inspires mankind instead of the inevitable will of nothingness that science will one day bring (1.12). More broadly, Nietzsche wants mankind to aspire to greatness and wants more people “to will their way to power” like Zarathustra (3.4). Unfortunately, this can only be done through renouncing the very morals that society values the most because the sickly man likes the crutch of an external morality. Thus, we choose to wallow in a sea of our own misery instead of aspiring to be great because we are attached to our external system of morality instead of having the courage to create our own values.
However, Nietzsche must explain how every man can will his way to power because there seems to be something extremely anarchic and dangerous about each man in society expressing his will to dominate over another. Without a clarification by Nietzsche, it seems mankind could potentially destroy itself. However, Nietzsche explains who exactly should will his way to power when he says of the powerful “Their right to exist, the privilege of the full-toned bell over the false and cracked, is a thousand times greater: they alone are our warranty for the future, they are alone are liable for the future of man” (3.14). As we can see, Nietzsche only wants the strong to will their way to power because the strong are the ones who will mold society. Perhaps it is true that Nietzsche seeks somewhat of an extermination of the weak by the strong, but more importantly Nietzsche wants those who are healthy, the strong, to will their way to power because they have the capacities to achieve that greatness which Nietzsche values so much. Nietzsche, like Tocqueville, believes that man has become mundane and boring; he needs to aspire to some sort of greatness in order to make his life worth living. Only the strong have the ability to do this, and thus they are the only ones who should aspire to will their power. Additionally, the strong would not will to power over each other because Zarathustra would inspire the very fear that would keep the strong in line (1.12). Instead, the strong must be more concerned with overcoming the two worst contagions that the weak present, the great nausea at man and the great pity at man because these are the two ideals that have made the ascetic ideal prevalent in mankind (3.14).
We have seen what Nietzsche expects for the future, but if we are to understand if man can ever turn off his will to power, we must delve into the origins of Judeo-Christian morality. By using etymology to trace the origin of the word “good”, Nietzsche first makes a distinction between Good vs. Bad and Good vs. evil in Judeo-Christian morality. To be exact, “Good vs. Bad” was the first morality, which was invented by the warrior classes of ancient Judeo-Christian societies. The “Good” described the beautiful, rich intelligent, and skillful blonde ruling class and anything opposite to this was considered “Bad” (i.e. ugly, poor). However, the slave class developed a philosophy that celebrated its misery, and as Nietzsche says of this ressentiment , “And he is good who does not outrage, who harms nobody, who does not attack, who does not requite, who leaves revenge to God, who keeps himself hidden as we do, who avoids evil and desires” (1.13). In particular, Nietzsche believes that humans, like God, have hidden their natural tendencies by adopting the new morality of “Good vs. Evil.” Unlike the morality of “Good vs. Bad,” which came from an inward evaluation by the warriors on their own attributes, the new morality is a reactive philosophy which restricts creative behavior. In this new morality, people celebrate their suffering and honor self-destructive behavior. By doing so, man’s natural tendencies to will to power and cause pain are brought inward and almost negated. With this slave morality, man is dishonest with himself. He wants to be able to dominate over others by his own rules, but the slave is too weak to physically control the warrior class. Instead, the slave class uses their wit and hides their propensity to seek power by imposing guilt and morality on everyone.
Additionally, while Nietzsche seems to dismiss the slave morality as uncreative, it also seems that Nietzsche gives credit to the Jews when he discusses the ingenuity they used to implement their doctrine. It may seem that this contradicts Nietzsche’s claims about Judeo-Christian morality, but upon closer inspection this is not true. When describing Judeo Christian practice, Nietzsche says, “A race of such men of ressentiment is bound to become eventually cleverer than any noble race; it will also honor cleverness to a far greater degree: namely, as a condition of existence of the first importance” (1.10). In regards to slave morality, Nietzsche admires how its formation was a new way of expressing a will to power. Previously, the warrior class expressed its power through brute strength, skill and beauty. Nietzsche admired this type of greatness in the warriors, as their morality came from inward reflection and not a violent jealousy. (This value giving to oneself is exactly what Nietzsche wants his overmen to do ). He admires the slaves even more because they perfected or trumped this type of power. Clearly, the slaves couldn’t dominate the warrior class physically, so they used a more advanced and systematic way of controlling them, namely, their intelligence. In a sense, the faculties of the mind were developed more because a new way to inflict punishment was developed, and man also developed a stronger sense of power.
Though Nietzsche admires the ingenuity behind the slavery morality, he despises its implementation. As we stated earlier, the slave morality is reactive not proactive; it needs another party on which to impose its hate and passion (1.10). Thus, it cannot be an effective system of morality because it is dependent on another object instead of relying on itself. Not only that, but its universal claims do not coincide with Nietzsche’s belief on the truth. According to Nietzsche knowledge is only valuable, or in this case values, are only valuable if they add to one’s own power and greatness (p.6). In the case of slave morality, all of mankind becomes weaker and less powerful because everyone must adhere to the same morality; the exact opposite of what Nietzsche thinks is good. (Remember, man becomes a more creative beast through openly expressing his will to power and cause pain). Thus, any good from slave morality’s ingenuity is lost in its practical application and we can conclude that man’s will to power can never be turned off, but only harnessed in a particular manner.
What Nietzsche also needs to clarify is how the philanthropic acts of the Judeo Christians coincide with one’s will to power, for on the surface these acts seem to contradict his theory that everyone grasps for power. However, Nietzsche clarifies this problem, when he says of the slave morality, “These weak people- some day or other they too intend to be the strong, there is no doubt of that, some day their kingdom too shall come-they term it “the kingdom of God”” (1.15). In the slave morality, a person’s will to power expresses itself in a hope of future domination, that is to say, the slave hopes to control the master in the afterlife. During his time on earth, it is impossible for the slave to control the master because he is weaker, ugly, poorer, etc. However he can have faith, faith in one day subjecting the master to all those things that he cannot subject him to on earth. All the slave needs to do is adopt the virtues of humility, generosity, patience, etc (1.14). To prove this claim even more, Nietzsche lists a variety of religious scripture that celebrates the enslavement of those who are not virtuous (1.15). Most importantly, these scriptures clarify the most important fact about man: man has a thirst for power that can only be satisfied through another manifestation of the will to power, that is to say, revenge enacted on the master through either earth or heaven.
Another problem arises for Nietzsche in the way he attacks Judeo-Christian morality. Nietzsche says the slave morality is reactive and vicious to oneself. Problematically, by attacking the foundation of morality in these respective religions, it seems from Nietzsche’s preface that he, too, has reacted to Judeo-Christian morality situation in the same manner as he claims the weak reacted to the strong and by potentially doing this would be ironically validating modern day perspectives on morality . However, by closely following Nietzsche’s argument, we see that this is not exactly true because of what Nietzsche says of himself. As he says, “At this point it behooves me only to be silent; or I shall usurp that to which only one younger, “heavier with future,” and stronger than I has a right- that to which Zarathustra has a right, Zarathustra the godless” (2.25). Strikingly, Nietzsche himself doesn’t believe he is one of the strong people that can impart his own values on himself! The very fact that Nietzsche does not conceive of himself as one of the overmen allows him to write and explore knowledge to the full extent. Even more, it distinguishes him from other philosophers because he is not like one of the philosophers who try to govern other people by establishing a universal truth (3.12). Instead, without the velleity, Nietzsche is like the artist he describes in the third essay of his book (3.4). He conceives of the perfect ideal that man can follow and even though he can never achieve this ideal, the conception he gives to society is still important. (We may also note that this absolves Nietzsche from the proverbial paradox that exists with the question “What is the value of knowledge,” which by its very nature assumes a value in the answer, for Nietzsche is not trying to claim that he himself is one of the strong. Instead, Nietzsche makes an appeal to the strong to construct their own meaning in life, which he can’t do himself).
Although Nietzsche has explained how man’s will to power manifests itself into different forms, he has yet to show how the ascetic ideal, which is opposite to man’s nature and thus represses man’s will to power, continues to develop in mankind. To understand this problem, we must go back to the origins of bad conscience, which come from the creditor-debtor relationship (2.9). According to Nietzsche, guilt first originated from this relationship because man felt an outward obligation to pay back his debt (2.9). When a debt was not repaid, pain was the punishment inflicted on the debtor. However, this pain had a special effect on the man, for as Nietzsche says, “Man could never do without blood, torture, and sacrifices when he felt the need to create a memory for himself” (2.3). In particular, Nietzsche believes that memory only comes from the arduous and torturous experiences which we subject ourselves to in life. In fact, the pain of all these experiences erases the memory one has of anything else! The only thing man can remember are his painful memories, and from this memory man conceives of the morality we now use today.
More importantly, memory allows us to have responsibility and make a promise- the very things necessary to join society. However, the blonde beasts created society in order to control physically weaker people, and thus took away our very will to power in the creditor-debtor relationship (2.17). Now, man’s guilt is turned inward because through society’s laws man cannot express his will to power over others. In fact, because mans will to power is imprinted so profoundly on man’s mind, he punishes himself in the way he would like to punish others, that is to say, as much as he possibly can (2.16)!
From Nietzsche’s description of the origin of bad conscience, it seems that man would be better to leave society in its entirety because it is only in society that man’s will to power is turned inward . However, once we understand Nietzsche’s problem with society, we see why he does not condone a reversion to the past and we also see why he presents Zarathustra as the solution to society’s problems. As Nietzsche says of man’s transition to society, “they were reduced to thinking, reckoning, co-ordinating cause and effect, these unfortunate creatures; they were reduced to their “consciousness,”… at the same time the old instincts had not suddenly ceased to make their usual demands!” (2.16). By making man dependent on others and therefore bound by some order, Nietzsche claims that society repressed all of man’s natural instincts. Now, entrance into society is what turns man’s guilt inward as we stated above, but more saliently it means that man’s constant conflict between his nature and the ascetic ideals that society imposes on him will never end, that is, this conflict will never end if the two are not in unison with each other.
Throughout history, man has always tried to convert his will to power, i.e. his natural state, to conform to society mores and values (the ascetic ideal) because he could never turn this will to power off. Yet, man has hurt himself by expressing this will to power in anything other than direct manifestations against others. Instead, Nietzsche posits that man do the reverse; Zarathustra, the great man of the future, will have the courage to change societal mores and values (get rid of the ascetic ideal) to conform with his will to power. This way, mans will to power, his freedom to do whatever he wants, can be expressed to its full potential.
Furthermore, Nietzsche needs to explain how these overmen would gain the courage to adopt their own values. At first, it would seem impossible for anyone to adopt a new set of values, but Nietzsche explains how this is possible in the preface and at the same time explains what he wants to do in this book. In the preface, Nietzsche laments the value of pity and how his own questions on the subject led him to question the value of morality in general. In describing these emotions, Nietzsche articulates the point and goal of his entire book, for he says,
Let us articulate this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, the values of these values themselves must first be called into question-and for that there is needed a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which they grew, under which they evolved and changed… a knowledge of a kind that has never yet existed or even been desired. (P.6)
Specifically in this book, Nietzsche hopes to convince the strong to question their very values and beliefs. He believes this is possible because nobody before him has questioned the value of knowledge. Indeed, this is the entire purpose of Nietzsche’s book; he wants to question and critique the value of knowledge because his answer will incite those overmen to question their very values (3.27). In doing so, he will bring along the great revolution that he seeks and Zarathustra will rise to power. This is why Nietzsche spends so little time describing the future and instead criticizing the more of society; he is not one of the chosen overmen, but he does know that he can at least show them the path to greatness, which they should seek.
What Nietzsche must explain is why knowledge of this kind has never been sought before, for without an explanation to this very question our claim that Nietzsche could incite the overmen into action would be erroneous. Nietzsche explains why philosophers and people in general have not tackled this question before, for he says, “One has taken the value of these “values” as given, as factual, as beyond all question; one has hitherto never doubted or hesitated in the slightest degree in supposing ‘the good man’ to be of greater value than ‘the evil man,’ of furthering the advancement and prosperity of man in general” (p.6). Strikingly, Nietzsche makes the argument that men never stop to question the value of the knowledge they follow. We suppose that the “good” is best because society has given us this conception from the time we were born. However, Nietzsche posits the opposite possibility. What if man is most powerful and glorious through living what we consider to be a “bad” life? If the answer is yes, perhaps Nietzsche has denaturalized morality. More importantly, Nietzsche hopes to change the way the strong see their lives because only they have the courage or the ability to do something with this information.
Regardless of the answer, and maybe this is not recognized by Nietzsche himself, a certain intrinsic worth is derived for everyone from answering this question. At the very least, Nietzsche will change our convictions in our given beliefs by strengthening them, weakening them or changing them all together, and this is what makes reading Nietzsche important for everyone. Nietzsche wants to reach his overmen; he has yet to do so, but he also predicted that it would take up to two centuries to do so. Instead, Nietzsche has shown us man’s natural predilection for wanting power and how man must express this will to power in any form imaginable. Additionally, he has provided a history of the development of the ascetic ideal that has repressed man’s will to power for hundreds of years. More importantly, he has provided another side to the story of morality, and made us question the values, the ascetic ideals, which we hold so dear.
Want to reach me? E-mail me at nickhil@nickhil.com
